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Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the 
Horror of Existence 
PHILIP J. KAIN 
I 
A t the center ofNietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror 
of existence" (BT 3). As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy: 
There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the 
wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus .... When Silenus at last fell into his 
hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. 
Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, 
he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: "Oh, wretched ephemeral 
race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it 
would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond 
your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you 
is-to die soon." (BT3)1 
Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human 
beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells 
us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What 
they cannot live with is meaningless suffering-suffering for no reason at all 
( GMIII:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . .. " (GM 
III:28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look 
into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that 
those who would know it completely would perish ... " (BGE 39; cf. WP 822). 
And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the 
horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April I 0, 1888, he writes: 
"Around 1876 my health grew worse .... There were extremely painful and 
obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long 
years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year con-
tained for me two hundred days of pain .... My specialty was to endure the 
extremity of pain ... with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, 
with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us 
how significant this suffering was for him: 
I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the 
hardest years of my life than to any others .... And as to my prolonged illness, 
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do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind 
of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not 
actually kill it!-To it, I owe even my philosophy . ... Only great suffering is the 
ultimate emancipator of the spirit. ... Only great suffering; that great suffering, 
under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its 
time-forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths .... (NCW 
"Epilogue") 
Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, over-
looked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his 
thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the 
centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider 
three different visions of the human condition. 
The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively 
planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. 
We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know 
it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly 
speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and 
Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the 
modem world-few really believe in it anymore. 
The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This 
view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most mod-
ems. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying 
nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human 
beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through 
technology. We must make it fit us. it does not fit us by design. We must work on 
it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create 
our own place. For these modem thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients 
and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added 
satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own 
endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the peifectible cosmos. 
The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human 
beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. 
And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never 
surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. 
It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is 
Nietzsche's view. 
Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in 
anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible 
cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being. 5 For Nietzsche, 
we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, 
make progress ( see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684 )-the outlook ofliberals, socialists, and 
even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For 
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Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply 
weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos ifwe hope 
to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen 
ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of 
man so far ... " (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GMII:7). 
If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, 
Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed-paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not 
be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature 
of things (BT7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion ... first 
saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that 
thought ... can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable 
not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical 
illusion accompanies science as an instinct ... " (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, 
we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridicu-
lous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of 
joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). 
Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action-which requires distance 
and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we 
are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning 
for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no 
reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a 
meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars 
and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be 
celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is 
punishment for sin (GMII:7; cf. D 78). 
One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we 
can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? 
Isn't it just obvious that modem science and technology have done so? Isn't it 
just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't 
such change already occurred? 
Well, perhaps not. Even modem environmentalists might resist all this 
obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology 
may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the 
perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean 
pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the 
solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty 
requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which 
we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt-not at all 
something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The 
widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving 
our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibi-
otics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those 
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antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, 
and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure 
syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. 
Even ifwe could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffer-
ing, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains 
a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, 
perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken 
us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. 
But whatever we think aboutthe possibility ofreducing suffering, the question 
may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out 
of the way comer of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling 
solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That 
was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but neverthe-
less, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled 
and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress 
we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think 
we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and acci-
dental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally 
confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. 
The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that 
we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the 
designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or 
central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make 
up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basi-
cally expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a 
perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos 
is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our 
own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce 
suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suf-
fering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very 
essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless 
suffering-suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed-it can only 
be concealed. 
Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of 
change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science 
and technology can transform the essence of things-he rejects the notion that 
human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only 
thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a 
meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot 
be eliminated. 
We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss 
Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of 
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Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot 
dismiss this view ifwe hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, 
we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it. 
II 
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time in The 
Gay Science 341: 
The greatest weight.-What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will 
have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but 
every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great 
in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence-even this 
spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke 
thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered 
him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained 
possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in 
each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would 
lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become 
to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirma-
tion and seal? (GS 341)6 
It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed. Nietzsche demands 
that it actually be loved. In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati: 
"My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants noth-
ing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.Not merely bear 
what is necessary, still less conceal it ... but love it" (EH "Clever" 10; cf. GS 
276). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra says: "To redeem those who lived 
in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'-that alone should 
I call redemption" (ZII: "On Redemption"; cf. Z III: "On Old and New Tablets" 
3). To tum all "it was" into a "thus I willed if' is to accept fate fully, to love it. 
One would have it no other way; one wants everything eternally the same: "Was 
that life? ... Well then! Once more!" (ZIV: "The Drunken Song" 1 ). 
How are we to understand these doctrines? Soll argues that eternal recurrence 
of the same would not crush us at all. If every detail of one recurrence were exactly 
the same as every detail of another, if they were radically indistinguishable, recur-
rence would not be terrifying. To be terrified, Soll thinks, we would have to be 
able to accumulate new experience from cycle to cycle, remember past recur-
rences, and tremble in anticipation of their return. If all recurrences were exactly 
the same, if new experience could not build and accumulate, recurrence would 
be a matter of complete indifference.7 I think this view is mistaken. In the first 
place, people who lead a life of intense suffering often look forward to death as 
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an escape from that suffering. Aeneas, for example, when he visits the underworld 
in book VI of the Aeneid, expects just that. When he finds that he will have to be 
reincarnated, he is appalled. His next reincarnated life, it is true, would not be 
exactly the same, as for Nietzschean eternal recurrence, but Aeneas seems to 
expect it to be similar enough in its misery and suffering. And despite the fact that 
in his reincarnated life he would not remember his present life, Aeneas is never-
theless horrified at the idea that he will have to go through it all again. 8 
Furthermore, although it is true that experience cannot build and accumulate 
from cycle to cycle, nevertheless, we must recognize that there are places in which 
Nietzsche suggests that it is possible to remember earlier recurrences. 9 Moreover, 
we can certainly be aware of other recurrences in the sense that we believe in 
them-the demon informs us of these other recurrences. This raises no problems 
as long as the very same memory, awareness, and reaction recur in each and every 
cycle at the very same point-each and every cycle must be exactly the same. It 
is possible that Soll assumes that such memories, awarenesses, and reactions 
would necessarily make the cycles different because they would have to be absent 
in at least one cycle-the first. 10 But that would be a mistake. Nietzsche is quite 
clear. Time is infinite (Z III: "On the Vision and the Riddle" 2; WP 1066)-there 
is no first cycle. These memories, awarenesses, and reactions could occur in all 
cycles at exactly the same point in the sequence. 
Still, Soll argues that it is "impossible for there to be among different recur-
rences of a person the kind of identity that seems to exist among the different 
states of consciousness of the same person within a particular recurrence .... 
Only by inappropriately construing the suffering of some future recurrence on 
the model of suffering later in this life does the question of eternal recurrence 
of one's pain weigh upon one with 'the greatest stress."'11 I think this too is mis-
taken. I can very well not want to live my life again even if in the next cycle I 
will not remember the pain of this cycle. If I am to love my life, not want to 
change the slightest detail, if I am to desire to live it again, it does not matter if 
in the future cycle I do not remember this cycle. If the demon tells me, ifl believe, 
that the future cycle will be exactly the same, if I know that now, then it could 
be quite difficult, right now, to be positive enough about my existing painful life 
to choose to go through it again, even if when I do go through it again I will not 
remember it. 
Soll's point gains whatever plausibility it has by looking back from a future 
life at our present life and denying that we could remember anything or trem-
ble in anticipation of its return. But that is not the only perspective one can take 
on the matter, and it is not the perspective Nietzsche wants to emphasize. For 
Nietzsche the demon forces us to look over our present life, reflect on it, test our 
attitude toward it, and assess the degree of positiveness we have toward it. We 
do that by asking how we feel about having to live it over again without the 
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slightest change. What is relevant here is how we feel about our present life at 
the present moment. 12 
It is also irrelevant to suggest that there is insufficient identity for me to think 
that it will really be me in the next cycle. The point, for Nietzsche, is how I react 
to my present life-the threat of a future life is brought up to elicit this reaction. 
Ifl do not identify with the person who will live my next life, ifl do not care about 
that person, if I consider that person an other, then I evade the question the demon 
put to me-and I avoid the heart of the issue. The question is whether I love my 
life, my present life-love it so completely that I would live it again. I am being 
asked if I would live my life again to see if I love my present life. If I insist on 
viewing the liver of my next life as an other, the least I should do is ask myself 
whether I love my present life enough that I could wish it on another. 
At any rate, Nietzsche claims that just thinking about the possibility of eternal 
recurrence can shatter and transform us. 13 In published works, eternal recurrence 
is presented as the teaching of a sage, as the revelation of a demon, or as a thought 
that gains possession of one. In The Gay Science 341, we must notice, eternal 
recurrence is not presented as a truth. Many commentators argue that it simply 
does not matter whether or not it is true; its importance lies in the effect it has 
on those who believe it. 14 
I have written at length about this complex doctrine elsewhere. I refer the 
reader there for further treatment of details. 15 What I want to do here is point 
out that the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence, the philosopher who 
believes in amor fati, is the very same philosopher who also believes in the hor-
ror of existence. This is a point that is never emphasized-indeed, it is hardly 
even noticed-by commentators. 16 Lou Salome tells us that Nietzsche spoke to 
her of eternal recurrence only "with a quiet voice and with all signs of deepest 
horror .... Life, in fact, produced such suffering in him that the certainty of an 
eternal return oflife had to mean something horrifying to him."17 
Try to imagine yourself with a migraine. Imagine yourself in a feverish state 
experiencing nausea and vomiting. Imagine that this sort of thing has been going 
on for years and years and that you have been unable to do anything about it. 
Extreme care with your diet, concern for climate, continuous experimenting with 
medicines-all accomplish nothing. You are unable to cure yourself. You have 
been unable to even improve your condition significantly. 18 You have no expec-
tation of ever doing so. Suppose this state has led you to see, or perhaps merely 
confirmed your insight into, the horror and terror of existence. It has led you to 
suspect that Silenus was right: best never to have been born; second best, die as 
soon as possible. All you can expect is suffering, suffering for no reason at all, 
meaningless suffering. You have even thought of suicide (BGE 157). 19 Now imag-
ine that at your worst moment, your loneliest loneliness, a demon appears to you 
or you imagine a demon appearing to you. And this demon tells you that you will 
have to live your life over again, innumerable times more, and that everything, 
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every last bit of pain and suffering, every last migraine, every last bout of nausea 
and vomiting, will return, exactly the same, over and over and over again. 
What would your reaction be? If your reaction were to be negative, no one 
would bat an eye. But what if your reaction was, or came to be, positive? What 
if you were able to love your life so completely that you would not want to 
change a single moment-a single moment of suffering? What if you were to 
come to crave nothing more fervently than the eternal recurrence of every 
moment of your life? What if you were to see this as an ultimate confirmation 
and seal, nothing more divine? How could you do this? Why would you do this? 
Why wouldn't it be madness? What is going on here? How has this been 
overlooked by all the commentators? This cries out for explanation. 
Eternal recurrence, I think we can say, shows us the horror of existence. No 
matter what you say about your life, no matter how happy you claim to have 
been, no matter how bright a face you put on it, the threat of eternal recurrence 
brings out the basic horror in every life. Live it over again with nothing new? It 
is the "nothing new" that does it. That is how we make it through our existing 
life. We hope for, we expect, something new, something different, some 
improvement, some progress, or at least some distraction, some hope. If that is 
ruled out, if everything will be exactly the same in our next life, well that is a 
different story. If you think you are supremely happy with your life, just see 
what happens if you start to think that you will have to live it again. 
Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggested, look back over your life as a 
whole and feel that it was a good one-·a happy one. Would that make you want 
to live it again? Would you at the moment in which you feel that your life was 
a happy one also crave nothing more fervently than to live it again? What if your 
life was a joyous life or a proud life? It is quite clear that you could have a very 
positive attitude toward your life and not at all want to live it again. In fact, 
wouldn't the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew on you and gained 
possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldn't 
the expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldn't it 
empty your life of its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to 
assume that the only life we could expect anyone to want to live again would 
be a good life. That makes no sense to me. On the other hand, most people would 
assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the sort oflife it makes 
any sense to want to live again. I think Nietzsche was able to see that a life of 
intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want 
to live again. Let me try to explain. 
For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea, and vomit-
ing. Often he was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. He tried 
everything. He sought a better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He exper-
imented with medicines. Nothing worked. He could not improve his condition. 
His suffering was out of his control. It dominated his life and determined his 
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every activity. He was overpowered by it. There was no freedom or dignity here. 
He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was he to do? 
At the beginning of the essay "On the Sublime," Schiller writes: 
[N]othing is so unworthy of man than to suffer violence .... [W]hoever suffers this cravenly 
throws his humanity away .... This is the position in which man finds himself. Surrounded 
by countless forces, all of which are superior to his own and wield mastery over him .... 
Ifhe is no longer able to oppose physical force by his relatively weaker physical force, then 
the only thing that remains to him, ifhe is not to suffer violence, is to eliminate utterly and 
completely a relationship that is so disadvantageous to him, and to destroy the very concept 
of a force to which he must in fact succumb. To destroy the very concept ofa force means 
simply to submit to it voluntarily.20 
Although Nietzsche did not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, 
nevertheless, this is exactly what Nietzsche did. What was he to do about his 
suffering? What was he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every 
moment of his life? What was he to do about the fact that it was robbing him of 
all freedom and dignity? What was he to do about this subjugation and slavery? 
He decided to submit to it voluntarily. He decided to accept it fully. He decided 
that he would not change one single detail of his life, not one moment of pain. 
He decided to love his fate. At the prospect of living his life over again, over 
again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with every detail 
of suffering and pain the same, he was ready to say, "Well then! Once more!" 
(ZIV: "The Drunken Song" 1 ). He could not change his life anyway. But this 
way he broke the psychological stranglehold it had over him. He ended his sub-
jugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all "it was" into a "thus I willed 
it." Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he 
willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his 
illness except by embracing it. 
III 
I think we are now in a position to see that for eternal recurrence to work, for 
it to have the effect that it must have for Nietzsche, we must accept without 
qualification, we must love, every single moment of our lives, every single 
moment of suffering. We cannot allow ourselves to be tempted by what might 
at first sight seem to be a much more appealing version of eternal recurrence, 
that is, a recurring life that would include the desirable aspects of our pres-
ent life while leaving out the undesirable ones. To give in to such temptation 
would be to risk losing everything that has been gained. To give in to such 
temptation, I suggest, would allow the suffering in our present life to begin 
to reassert its psychological stranglehold. We would start to slip back into 
subjugation. We would again come to be dominated by our suffering. We 
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would spend our time trying to minimize it, or avoid it, or ameliorate it, or 
cure it. We would again become slaves to it. 
For the same reason, I do not think it will work for us to accept eternal recur-
rence merely because of one or a few grand moments-for the sake of which 
we are willing to tolerate the rest of our lives. Magnus holds that all we need 
desire is the return of one peak experience.21 This suggests that our attitude 
toward much of our life, even most of it, could be one of toleration, acceptance, 
or indifference-it could even be negative. All we need do is love one great 
moment and, because all moments are interconnected (Z IV: "The Drunken 
Song" 1 O; WP I 032), that then will require us to accept all moments. This would 
be much easier than actually loving all moments of one's life-every single 
detail. The latter is what is demanded in Ecce Homo, which says that amor fati 
means that one "wants nothing to be different" and that we "[ n ]ot merely bear 
what is necessary ... but love it" (EH "Clever" 10, emphasis added [ except to 
love]). We want "a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering .... Nothing 
in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable ... " (EH"BT" 2). Ifwe 
do not love every moment of our present life for its own sake, those moments 
we do not love, those moments we accept for the sake of one grand moment, I 
suggest, will begin to wear on us.22 We will begin to wish we did not have to 
suffer through so many of them, we will try to develop strategies for coping with 
them, we will worry about them, they will start to reassert themselves, they will 
slowly begin to dominate us, and pretty soon we will again be enslaved by them. 
Our attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, or 
reduce it---oritwill again begin to dominate us. Indeed, inEcce Homo, Nietzsche 
says that he had to display a "Russian fatalism." He did so by 
tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, 
and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better 
than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed-than rebelling 
against them. 
Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to 
annoy me mortally-and it actually was mortally dangerous every time. 
Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself "different" -that is in such 
cases great reason itself. (EH "Wise" 6) 
Eternal recurrence is an attempt to deal with meaningless suffering. It is an 
attempt to do so that completely rejects an approach to suffering that says, Let's 
improve the world, let's change things, let's work step by step to remove suf-
fering-the view ofliberals and socialists whom Nietzsche so often rails against. 
If it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering in the world, as Nietzsche 
thinks it is, then to make it your goal to try to do so is to enslave yourself to that 
suffering. 
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IV 
We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering 
and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punish-
ment for sin. Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us 
back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, 
it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. 
Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. 
In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as 
much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). 
Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning here-it is just that it lies pre-
cisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing 
suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffer-
ing for no reason at all. But at the very same time, this creates the innocence of 
existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. 
That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old 
meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. Suffering 
can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt. There is no 
longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). If suffer-
ing just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one 
be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We 
are innocent. This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eter-
nal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment 
of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be 
loving one's own redemption from guilt. 
Eternal recurrence brings the Obermensch as close as possible to the truth, 
meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even 
the Obermensch. Eternal recurrence gives the 0-bermensch meaning. It elimi-
nates emptiness. It fills the void. With what? It fills it with something totally 
familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, differ-
ent, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with 
one's own life-repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, 
but (given the horror of existence) suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at 
least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by con-
cepts of sin, punishment, or guilt. It has been reduced to a life of innocence. 
Moreover, as Nietzsche has said, it is only meaningless suffering that is the 
problem. If given a meaning, even suffering becomes something we can seek 
(GM III:28). Eternal recurrence, the fatedness of suffering, its meaningless 
repetition, makes our suffering innocent. That might well be reason enough to 
embrace it. Or, although we may not be able to embrace it ourselves, I think we 
can at least see why Nietzsche might-and even why it might make sense for 
him to do so. 
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Eternal recurrence also gives suffering another meaning. If one is able to 
embrace eternal recurrence, if one is able to tum all "it was" into a "thus I willed 
it," then one not only reduces suffering to physical suffering, breaks its psycho-
logical stranglehold, and eliminates surplus suffering related to guilt, but one may 
even in a sense reduce suffering below the level of physical suffering. One does 
not do this as the liberal, socialist, or Christian would, by changing the world to 
reduce suffering. In Nietzsche's opinion that is impossible, and, indeed, eternal 
recurrence of the same rules it out-at least as any sort of final achievement.23 
Rather, physical suffering is reduced by treating it as a test, a discipline, a training, 
which brings one greater power. One might think of an athlete who engages in 
more and more strenuous activity, accepts greater and greater pain, handles it bet-
ter and better, and sees this as a sign of greater strength, as a sign of increased abil-
ity. Pain and suffering are turned into empowerment. Indeed, it is possible to love 
such suffering as a sign of increased power. One craves pain-"more pain! more 
pain!" ( GMIII:20). And the more suffering one can bear, the stronger one becomes. 
If suffering is self-imposed, if the point is to break the psychological stran-
glehold it has over us, if the point is to tum suffering into empowerment, use it 
as a discipline to gain greater strength, then it would be entirely inappropriate for 
us to feel sorry for the sufferer. To take pity on the sufferer either would demon-
strate an ignorance of the process the sufferer is engaged in, what the sufferer is 
attempting to accomplish through suffering, or would show a lack of respect for 
the sufferer's suffering ( GS 338; D 135). To pity the sufferer, to wish the sufferer 
did not have to go through such suffering, would demean the sufferer and the 
whole process of attempting to gain greater strength through such suffering. 
Let us try again to put ourselves in Nietzsche's place. He has suffered for 
years. He has suffered intensely for years. He has come to realize that he can-
not end this suffering. He cannot even reduce it significantly. But he has finally 
been able to break the psychological stranglehold it has had over him. He is able 
to accept it. He wills it. He would not change the slightest detail. He is able to 
love it. And this increases his strength. How, then, would he respond to our pity? 
Very likely, he would be offended. He would think we were patronizing him. 
He would not want us around. He would perceive us as trying to rob him of the 
strength he had achieved, subjugate him again to his suffering, strip him of his 
dignity. He would be disgusted with our attempt to be do-gooders, our attempt 
to impose our own meaning on his suffering (treating it as something to pity and 
to lessen) in opposition to the meaning he has succeeded in imposing on it. 
Nietzsche wagers a lot on his commitment to the notion that suffering cannot 
be significantly reduced in the world. For if it can, then pity and compassion 
would be most important to motivate the reduction of suffering. Nietzsche is so 
committed to the value of suffering that he is willing to remove, or at least 
radically devalue, pity and compassion. 
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To appreciate how committed he is, suppose we are incorrigible do-gooders-
liberals, socialists, or Christians. We just cannot bear to see anyone suffer. 
Suppose we find a researcher who is working on a cure for Nietzsche's disease. 
This researcher thinks that within a few years a drug can be produced to eliminate 
the disease. Suppose the researcher is right. And suppose that just as Nietzsche 
has solidly committed to eternal recurrence,just as he is able to love his fate,just 
as he has decided he would not change the slightest detail of his life, we tell him 
about this cure. 
How would Nietzsche respond? Would he accept the cure? Would he give up 
his hard-won attitude of accepting his migraines, nausea, and vomiting, of refus-
ing to desire any change? Would he revert to his old attitude of hoping to reduce 
his suffering, trying out whatever might accomplish this? Would he give his ill-
ness a chance to reassert its psychological stranglehold? We must remember that 
our supposition is that he would actually be cured in a few years. But he would 
also forgo the discipline, the strengthening, the empowerment that a commit-
ment to eternal recurrence and amorfati would have made possible. Although 
his illness would be cured, he would not have developed the wherewithal to deal 
with any other suffering-in a world characterized by the horror of existence. 
We cannot know whether Nietzsche would decide to take the cure or not. What 
we can be sure ofis that ifhe did, he would not be the Nietzsche we know. 
Kierkegaard retells the story of Abraham and Isaac. God commands Abraham 
to take his only son to Mount Moriah and to sacrifice him there as a burnt offer-
ing. Faithful Abraham sets off to obey God's will. But just as he arrives, just as 
he has drawn his knife, just as he is about to offer his son, he is told instead to 
sacrifice the ram that God has prepared. Kierkegaard suggests that ifhe had been 
in Abraham's position, ifhe had sufficient faith in God and had obeyed him as 
Abraham did, ifhe had been able to summon the same courage, then, when he 
got Isaac back again he would have been embarrassed. Abraham, he thinks, was 
not embarrassed. He was not embarrassed because he believed all along, by 
virtue of the absurd, that God would not require Isaac.24 
What about Nietzsche? Let us assume that Nietzsche has fully committed to 
eternal recurrence and amorfati, that he has come to love his fate, that he has 
decided he would not change the slightest detail. Moreover, he has announced 
this to the world in his writings. Let us assume that over the years this commit-
ment has empowered him, given him greater strength. We do-gooders now inform 
him that we can cure his disease and eliminate his suffering. Even further, suppose 
we were able to prove to him that eternal recurrence is impossible. Would 
Nietzsche be embarrassed? 
Maybe. But it is not absolutely clear that he would be. He might respond that 
believing in eternal recurrence-perhaps even by virtue of the absurd-allowed 
him to face the horror of existence. He might respond that it does not really matter 
whether his life will actually return. The only thing that matters is the attitude he 
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was able to develop toward his present life. He might respond that it does not really 
matter that it has become possible to cure his particular illness; there is still plenty 
of other suffering to be faced given the horror of existence. He might respond that 
what matters is the strength he was able to gain from believing in eternal recurrence 
and loving his fate, not whether eternal recurrence is actually true. 
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